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作译者

Jeffrey Church has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley. He is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Calgary and the Academic Director for the Centre for Regulatory Affairs in the Van Home Institute for International Transporta- tion and Regulatory Affairs. He was the 1995-1996 T.D. MacDonald Chair in Industrial Economics at the Canadian Competition Bureau. His published research includes articles on network economics, strategic competition, entry deterrence, intellectual property rights, and competition policy. He is the coauthor of a book on the regulation of natural gas pipelines in Canada. The popularity and effective- ness of his undergraduate industrial organization >Roger Ware is Professor of Economics at Queen"s University, Kingston, Canada. He taught pre- viously at the University of Toronto and has held a visiting position at the University of California at Berkeley. From 1993-1994 he held the T.D. MacDonald Chair in Industrial Organization at the Competition Bureau, Ottawa, giving advice to the Commissioner on a wide range of competition policy topics and cases. His research interests are focused on antitrust economics, intellectual prop- erty and the economics of the banking sector. He has published articles in all of these areas as well as numerous other publications in scholarly journals and books on Industrial Organization issues. He teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in Industrial Organization and has lectured widely on antitrust topics. He has also appeared as an expert witness in antitrust cases and regulatory hearings.

目录

I Foundations
Introduction
1.1 A More Formal Introduction to IO
1.1.1 The Demand for Industrial Organization
1.2 Methodologies
1.2.1 The New Industrial Organization
1.2.2 The Theory of Business Strategy
1.2.3 Antitrust Law
1.3 Overview of the Text
1.3.1 Foundations
1.3.2 Monopoly
1.3.3 Oligopoly Pricing
1.3.4 Strategic Behavior
1.3.5 Issues in Antitrust Economics
1.3.6 Issues in Regulatory Economics
1.4 Suggestions for Further Reading
The Welfare Economics of Market Power
2.1 Profit Maximization
2.2 Perfect Competition
2.2.1 Supply

2.2.2 Market Equilibrium
2.3 Efficiency
2.3.1 Measures of Gains from Trade
2.3.2 Pareto Optimality
2.4 Market Power
2.4.1 Market Power and Pricing
2.4.2 Measurement and Determinants of Market Power
2.4.3 The Determinants of Deadweight Loss
2.5 Market Power and Public Policy
2.6 Chapter Summary
2.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
Theory of the Firm
3.1 Neo> 3.1.1 Review of Cost Concepts
3.1.2 The Potential Advantages of Being Large
3.1.3 Economies of Scale and Seller Concentration
3.2 Why Do Firms Exist?
3.2.1 Two Puzzles Regarding the Scope of a Firm
3.2.2 Explanations for the Existence of Firms
3.2.3 Alternative Economic Organizations
3.2.4 Spot Markets
3.2.5 Specific Investments and Quasi-Rents
3.2.6 Contracts
3.2.7 Complete vs. Incomplete Contracts
3.2.8 Vertical Integration
3.3 Limits to Firm Size
3.3.1 The Paradox of Selective Intervention
3.3.2 Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm
3.4 Do Firms Profit Maximize?
3.4.1 Shareholder Monitoring and Incentive Contracts
3.4.2 External Limits to Managerial Discretion
3.5 Chapter Summary
3.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
II Monopoly
4 Market Power and Dominant Firms
4.1 Sources of Market Power
4.1.1 Government Restrictions on Entry
4.1.2 Structural Characteristics
4.1.3 Strategic Behavior by Incumbents
4.2 A Dominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe
4.2.1 The Effect of Entry
4.3 Durable Goods Monopoly
4.3.1 The Coase Conjecture
4.3.2 Pacman Economics
4.3.3 Coase vs. Pacman
4.3.4 Recycling
4.4 Market Power: A Second Look
4.4.1 X-Inefficiency
4.4.2 Rent Seeking
4.5 Benefits of Monopoly
4.5.1 Scale Economies
4.5.2 Research and Development
4.6 Chapter Summary
4.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
Non-Linear Pricing and Price Discrimination
5.1 Examples of Price Discrimination
5.2 Mechanisms for Capturing Surplus
5.3 Market Power and Arbitrage: Necessary Conditions for Price Discrimination
5.4 Types of Price Discrimination
5.4.1 First-Degree Price Discrimination
5.4.2 Third-Degree Price Discrimination
5.4.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination
5.4.4 General Non-Linear Pricing
5.4.5 Optimal Non-Linear Pricing
5.5 Antitrust Treatment of Price Discrimination
5.6 Chapter Summary
5.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
6 Market Power and Product Quality
6.1 Search Goods
6.1.1 Monopoly Provision of Quality
6.1.2 Quality Discrimination
6.2 Experience Goods and Quality
6.2.1 Moral Hazard and the Provision of Quality
6.2.2 The Lemons Problem
6.3 Signaling High Quality
6.3.1 A Dynamic Model of Reputation for Quality
6.3.2 Advertising as a Signal of Quality
6.3.3 Warranties
6.4 Chapter Summary
6.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
6.6 Appendix: The Complete Model of Quality Discrimination
III Oligopoly Pricing
Game Theory I
7.1 Why Game Theory?
7.2 Foundations and Principles
7.2.1 The Basic Elements of a Game
7.2.2 Types of Games
7.2.3 Equilibrium Concepts
7.2.4 Fundamental Assumptions
7.3 Static Games of Complete Information
7.3.1 Normal Form Representation
7.3.2 Dominant and Dominated Strategies
7.3.3 Rationalizable Strategies
7.3.4 Nash Equilibrium
7.3.5 Discussion and Interpretation of Nash Equilibria
7.3.6 Mixed Strategies
7.4 Chapter Summary
7.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
7.6 Appendix: Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Strategies
8 Classic Models of Oligopoly
8.1 Static Oligopoly Models
8.2 Cournot
8.2.1 Cournot Best-Response Functions and Residual Demand Functions
8.2.2 Properties of the Cournot Equilibrium
8.2.3 Free-Entry Cournot Equilibrium
8.2.4 The Efficient Number of Competitors
8 3 Bertrand Competition
8.3.1 The Bertrand Paradox
8.3.2 Product Differentiation
8.3.3 Capacity Constraints
8.4 Cournot vs. Bertrand
8.5 Empirical Tests of Oligopoly
8.5.1 Conjectural Variations
8.6 Chapter Summary
8.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
8.8 Appendix: Best-Response Functions, Reaction Functions, and Stability
8.8.1 Stability
8.8.2 Uniqueness
Game Theory II
9.1 Extensive Forms
9.2 Strategies vs. Actions and Nash Equilibria
9.3 Noncredible Threats
9.3.1 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
9.3.2 The Centipede Game
9.4 Two-Stage Games
9.5 Games of Almost Perfect Information
9.5.1 Finitely Repeated Stage Game
9.5.2 Infinitely Repeated Stage Game
9.6 Chapter Summary
9.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
9.8 Appendix: Discounting
10 Dynamic Models of Oligopoly
10.1 Reaching an Agreement
10.1.1 Profitability of Collusion
10.1.2 How Is an Agreement Reached?
10.1.3 Factors That Complicate Reaching an Agreement
10.2 Stronger, Swifter, More Certain
10.3 Dynamic Games
10.3.1 Credible Punishments and Subgame Perfection: Finite Games
10.4 Supergames
10.4.1 Subgame Perfection and Credible Threats: Infinite Game
10.4.2 Harsher Punishment Strategies
10.4.3 Renegotiation Proof Strategies
10.5 Factors That Influence the Sustainability of Collusion
10.6 Facilitating Practices
10.6.1 Efficiency and Facilitating Practices
10.7 Antitrust and Collusion
10.8 Chapter Summary
10.9 Suggestions for Further Reading
11 Product Differentiation
11.1 What Is Product Differentiation?
11.2 Monopolistic Competition
11.2.1 Preference Specification
11.2.2 Monopolistic Competition: Equilibrium
11.2.3 Too Many Brands of Toothpaste?
11.3 Bias in Product Selection
11.3.1 Asymmetric Preferences
11.4 Address Models
11.4.1 Consumer Preferences
11.4.2 A Simple Address Model: Hotelling"s Linear City
11.4.3 Free Entry into the Linear City
11.4.4 Localized Competition
11.4.5 Efficiency of the Market Equilibrium
11.4.6 Endogenous Pricing
11.4.7 Pricing and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation
11.5 Strategic Behavior
11.5.1 Brand Proliferation
11.5.2 Brand Specification
11.5.3 Brand Preemption
11.6 Oligopoly Equilibrium in Vertically Differentiated Markets
11.7 Chapter Summary
11.8 Suggestions for Further Reading
12 Identifying and Measuring Market Power
12.1 Structure, Conduct, and Performance
12.1.1 SCP in Practice: The Framework
12.1.2 SCP in Practice: The Results
12.1.3 Critiques of SCP Studies
12.2 The New Empirical Industrial Organization
12.2.1 Structural Models
12.2.2 Nonparametric, or Reduced-Form, Approaches
12.3 The NEIO and SCP: A Summing Up
12.4 Chapter Summary
12.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
IV Strategic Behavior
13 An Introduction to Strategic Behavior
13.1 Strategic Behavior
13.1.1 Strategic vs. Tactical Choices
13.2 The Stackelberg Game
13.2.1 Stackelberg Equilibrium
13.3 Entry Deterrence
13.3.1 Constant Returns to Scale
13.3.2 Economies of Scale
13.4 Introduction to Entry Games
13.4.1 Limit Pricing
13.4.2 A Stylized Entry Game
13.5 Chapter Summary
13.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
14 Entry Deterrence
14.1 The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence
14.1.1 Dixit"s Model of Entry Deterrence
14.1.2 Strategic Investment and Monopolization
14.2 Contestable Markets
14.2.1 Logical Possibility
14.2.2 Robustness
14.2.3 Empirical Relevance
14.2.4 Contestability and Barriers to Entry
14.3 Entry Barriers
14.3.1 Positive Definitions of Barriers to Entry
14.3.2 An Assessment of Barriers to Entry
14.3.3 Normative Definitions of Entry Barriers
14.4 Chapter Summary
14.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
15 Strategic Behavior: Principles
15.1 Two-Stage Games
15.2 Strategic Accommodation
15.3 Strategic Entry Deterrence
15.4 The Welfare Effects of Strategic Competition
15.5 Chapter Summary
15.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
16 Strategic Behavior: Applications
16.1 Learning by Doing
16.1.1 Learning with Price Competition
16.1.2 Learning and Entry Deterrence
16.2 Switching Costs
16.2.1 Strategic Manipulation of an Installed Base of Customers
16.2.2 Incorporating New Buyers
16.2.3 Endogenous Switching Costs
16.3 Vertical Separation
16.4 Tying
16.5 Strategic Trade Policy I: Export Subsidies to Regional Jets
16.6 Strategic Trade Policy Il:. The Kodak-Fujifilm Case
16.7 Managerial Incentives
16.8 Research and Development
16.9 The Coase Conjecture Revisited
16.10 Chapter Summary
16.11 Suggestions for Further Reading
17 Advertising and Oligopoly
17.1 Normative vs. Positive Issues: The Welfare Economics of Advertising
17.2 Positive Issues: Theoretical Analysis of Advertising and Oligopoly
17.2.1 Advertising as an Exogenous Sunk Cost
17.2.2 Advertising as an Endogenous Sunk Cost
17.2.3 Cooperative and Predatory Advertising
17.3 Advertising and Strategic Entry Deterrence
17.4 A More General Treatment of Strategic Advertising: Direct vs. Indirect Effects
17.5 Positive Issues: Advertising and Oligopoly Empirics
17.6 Chapter Summary
17.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
18 Research and Development
18.1 A Positive Analysis: Strategic R&D
18.2 Market Structure and Incentives for R&D
18.2.1 A More Careful View of Market Structure
18.2.2 Patent Races
18.2.3 Stochastic Patent Races
18.2.4 Product Innovation and Patent Races
18.3 Normative Analysis: The Economics of Patents
18.3.1 Other Forms of Intellectual Property Protection:
Copyrights and Trademarks
18.4 Chapter Summary
18.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
V Issues in Antitrust Economics
19 The Theory of the Market
19.1 The Concept of a Market
19.1.1 Economic Markets
19.1.2 Antitrust Markets
19.2 Antitrust Markets: The Search for Market Power
19.2.1 Market Power and Antitrust
19.2.2 Market Power and Market Shares
19.2.3 The Importance of Demand Elasticities
19.2.4 Critical Elasticities of Demand
19.2.5 Break-Even Elasticities of Demand
19.2.6 Recent Developments: Innovation Markets
19.3 The Practice of Market Definition
19.3.1 Demand Elasticities
19.3.2 The Structural Approach
19.3.3 Shipment Flows
19.3.4 Qualitative Evaluative Criteria
19.4 Antitrust Markets in Monopolization Cases: The Cellophane Fallacy
19.4.1 The Cellophane Fallacy and Mergers
19.5 Chapter Summary
19.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
20 Exclusionary Strategies I: Raising Rivals" Costs
20.1 A Simple Model of Raising Rivals" Costs
20.2 The Salop and Scheffman Model: Raising the Costs of a Competitive Fringe
20.3 Accommodation vs. Deterrence Strategies
20.4 A More General Treatment of Raising Rivals" Costs: Direct vs. Indirect Effects
20.5 Reducing Rivals" Revenue
20.6 Raising Rivals" Costs in Antitrust
20.7 Chapter Summary
20.8 Suggestions for Further Reading
21 Exclusionary Strategies II: Predatory Pricing
21.1 The Classic Chicago Attack on Predation
21.2 Rational Theories of Predation
21.2.1 The Long Purse
21.2.2 Reputation Models
21.2.3 Signaling Models of Predation
21.2.4 Softening Up the Victim
21.2.5 Predation in Learning and Network Industries
21.3 Empirical Evidence on Predation
21.3.1 Case Studies
21.3.2 Experimental Evidence
21.4 Predation in Antitrust
21.4.1 Areeda-Turner and Cost-Based "Definitions" of Predation
21.4.2 Major Antitrust Cases
21.5 Chapter Summary
21.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
21.7 Appendix: An Introduction to Games of Incomplete Information
21.7.1 Bayesian Games
21.7.2 Extensive-Form Bayesian Games with Observable Actions
21.7.3 Multiple but Finite Numbers of Victims in the Extortion Game
22 Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints
22.1 Incentives for Vertical Merger (Vertical Integration)
22.1.1 Transaction Economies
22.1.2 Vertical Integration to Avoid Double Marginalization
22.1.3 Vertical Integration with Perfect Competition Downstream:
Fixed Proportions
22.1.4 Vertical Integration with Perfect Competition Downstream:
Variable Proportions
22.2 Vertical Restraints
22.2.1 Restraints on Intrabrand Competition
22.2.2 Alternative Explanations of RPM and Exclusive Territorial Restrictions
22.2.3 RPM, Exclusive Territories, and Welfare
22.2.4 Antitrust Policy toward RPM and Exclusive Territories
22.3 Contractual Exclusivity
22.3.1 Tying Arrangements
22.3.2 Exclusive Dealing
22.4 Chapter Summary
22.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
22.6 Appendix: Price versus Non-Price Competition in the Winter Model
23 Horizontal Mergers
23.1 A Partial-Equilibrium Analysis of Horizontal Mergers
23.1.1 Price versus Efficiency: The Williamson Trade Off
23.1.2 The Use of the Herfindahl Index in Merger Analysis
23.2 Equilibrium with Nonmerging Firms: A More General Analysis
23.2.1 Mergers in Differentiated Markets
23.3 The Coordinated Effects of Mergers
23.4 Entry
23.5 Mergers: The Antitrust Framework
23.5.1 Merger Guidelines
23.5.2 Market Definition
23.5.3 Innovation Markets
23.5.4 Entry and Product Repositioning
23.5.5 Efficiencies: A Growing Emphasis
23.5.6 Methodology: The Growing Role of Simulation in Antitrust Analysis
23.6 Chapter Summary
23.7 Suggestions for Further Reading
23.8 Appendix: Bertrand Equilibrium with Three Differentiated Products
VI Issues in Regulatory Economics
24 Rationale for Regulation
24.1 Public Interest Justifications for Regulatory Intervention
24.1. l The Market Failure Test
24.1.2 Natural Monopoly
24.1.3 Large Specific Investments
24.2 The Economic Theories of Regulation
24.2.1 The Theory of Economic Regulation
24.2.2 Explaining Regulation Using a Principal-Agent Approach
24.3 Chapter Summary
24.4 Suggestions for Further Reading
24.5 Appendix: Subadditivity and Multiproduct Firms
25 Optimal Pricing for Natural Monopoly
25.1 Efficient Pricing by a Single-Product Natural Monopolist
25.1.1 First-Best Pricing
25.1.2 Second-Best Pricing: Ramsey Prices
25.1.3 First- vs. Second-Best Pricing
25.2 Multiproduct Natural Monopoly
25.2.1 Ramsey Pricing
25.3 Peak-Load Pricing
25.3.1 A Simple Illustrative Model of Peak-Load Pricing
25.3.2 Optimal Capacity
25.3.3 Discussion of Peak-Load Pricing
25.4 Multipart Tariffs
25.4.1 Two Common Examples of Multipart Tariffs
25.4.2 The Coase Result
25.4.3 N-Part Tariffs and a Menu of Two-Part Tariffs
25.4.4 Pareto-Dominating Block Tariffs
25.5 Chapter Summary
25.6 Suggestions for Further Reading
26 Issues in Regulation
26.1 Regulation under Asymmetric Information
26.1.1 The Full-Information Benchmark
26.1.2 Asymmetric Information: The Importance of Distributional
Considerations
26.1.3 An Optimal Regulatory Mechanism: Hidden Information
26.1.4 An Optimal Regulatory Mechanism: Hidden Action
26.1.5 Implications for Regulatory Regimes
26.2 Regulation in Practice
26.2.1 Cost-of-Service Regulation
26.2.2 An Assessment of COS Regulation
26.2.3 Summary of Cost-of-Service Regulation
26.2.4 Incentive Regulation
26.2.5 Guidelines for Regulation
26.3 Regulatory Reform in Network Industries
26.3.1 Why Regulated Firms Should Be Kept Out of Unregulated Markets
26.3.2 Access Pricing and Interconnection
26.3.3 The Interconnection Problem
26.3.4 The Efficient Component Pricing Rule
26.3.5 Optimal Access Pricing
26.4 Chapter Summary
26.5 Suggestions for Further Reading
Appendix The Legal Framework of Antitrust Enforcement
A.1 Antitrust in the United States
A.I.1 The Sherman Act
A. 1.2 The Clayton Act
A.I.3 Enforcement in the U.S.
A.2 Competition Policy in Canada
A.2.1 Criminal Provisions in the Competition Act
A.2.2 The Director of Research and Investigation
A.2.3 Noncriminal Reviewable Offenses
A.3 Competition Policy of the European Union
A.3.1 Enforcement in the EU
A.4 Suggestions for Further Reading
Selected Solutions for Odd Numbered Questions
Index of Names
Subject Index

前言

In the past two decades there has been an explosion of interest and intellectual activity in industrial organization. Industrial organization was irreversibly transformed and rejuvenated by breakthroughs in noncooperative game theory and, in turn, developments in industrial organization informed and reinvigorated antitrust enforcement. Industrial organization textbooks reflected neither this upheaval nor the excitement of studying a field that was in a period of rapid change, growth, and rising prominence. We set out to meet this challenge with a completely new and comprehensive book that systematically presents and makes accessible the advances and new learning of the past twenty years.
A focus and concern with market power underpins industrial organization, and it underpins and ties together Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach (IOSA). What are the determinants of market power? How do firms create, utilize, and protect it? When are antitrust entorcement or regulation appropriate policy responses to the creation, maintenance, or exercise of market power? The revolution in game theory provided the tools to understand competition as a battle for monopoly rents, where nonprice competition (advertising, product design, research and development, etc.) creates an environment where firms can harvest economic profits. The emphasis in IOSA is on strategic competition and how firms can shelter their market power and economic profits from competitors. The focus on firm conduct to acquire and maintain market power also establishes the intellectual foundation for determining which business practices warrant antitrust examination and prohibition, and in this regard the new learning underlies recent activist antitrust policy.
Applications and Antitrust
In a major innovation for an economics text, our book uses antitrust applications and antitrust cases as a constant "reality check" on the theoretical models that we develop. Antitrust cases provide a rare opportunity for open debate on "the right model" of firm behavior or a certain contractual practice. Moreover, given the aggressiveness and dramatic flourishes with which the interested parties pursue their cases, as well as the importance and high profile of cases in key sectors of the new economy, antitrust cases are a natural and effective device for engaging the interest of students. IOSA is packed full of case studies based on antitrust enforcement--both >Game Theory and Expositional Approach
We wanted to write a textbook that made it possible, indeed required, students to take an active role in learning. In IOSA we constantly challenge students with puzzles and questions, and the end-of- chapter problems provide a more structured tool for developing students" skills. Our extensive use of game theory is a natural partner for our "problem-solving" approach to the teaching of industrial organization. Our emphasis is not only on acquiring familiarity with the state of knowledge, but also on an integrated understanding of industrial organization--how to analyze and think logically about firm behavior using the conceptual tools we develop. Our goal was to write a textbook that put the emphasis on the development of students" analytical abilities.
Key Features of IOSA
Chapter I offers an overview of the book along with a discussion of the methodology currently used in the study of industrial organization. The distinctive features of IOSA are as follows:
・An emphasis on strategic behavior as an organizing principle for understanding nonprice com- petition. There are separate, chapter-length treatments of strategic behavior,entry deterrence,two-stage games, advertising, product differentiation, and R&D.
・Comprehensive coverage and extended treatments of such recent developments as incomplete contracts, property rights, and the boundaries of the firm; durable goods monopoly; nonlinear pricing; address models of product differentiation; supergames, tacit collusion, and facilitating practices; the new empirical industrial organization; the efficient component pricing rule and access pricing; regulatory and industry restructuring in network industries; and regulation under asymmetric information.
・An unmistakable and unique emphasis on antitrust, from using antitrust cases to illustrate theory to separate, up-to-date chapter-length treatments of market definition, raising rivals" costs, predatory pricing, horizontal mergers, and vertical restraints.
・An accessible development and presentation of theory through the use of simple, explicit functional forms, numeric examples, and/or graphical interpretations. The text works through the details of simplified models, the logic of the arguments, and the conclusions. The approach is rigorous without using mathematics beyond that of high school algebra. A prior course in intermediate microecomomies is an advantage but not a requirement.
・ The applicability and power,,t theory in understanding firm behavior and market outcomes is established with extcnsive case studies and examples, all integrated into the discussion in a way that enables students to make the leap from theory to practice.
・Careful attention to pedagogy and extensive efforts to make the study of industrial organization interesting and rewarding. Extensive pedagogy includes chapter-opening vignettes; highlight-ing of key terms; two-color diagrams; integrated cases, examples, and numeric exercises; suggestions for further reading that provide detailed guides to the literature and frontier de-velopments; and extensive end-of-chapter materials--summaries, problems,and discussion questions.
IOSA is supported by two ancillaries--an instructor"s manual and a Web site. The instructor"s manual provides solutions to all problems as well as suggestions for in->"Menus" of Chapters for One- and Two-Semester Courses
IOSA provides comprehensive coverage of industrial organization. The depth and breadth of IOSA"s coverage provides instructors with considerable flexibility to select material appropriate for their needs. For a one-semester course in industrial organization recommended core chapters are 1, 2, 3 (Section 3.1 only), 4 (Section 4.1 only), 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, and 15. Depending on the interests of the instructor and time available, three or four additional chapters can typically be covered. For a two-semester course in industrial organization recommended core chapters are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26. For a one-semester course with an emphasis on antitrust a possible course sequence is Chapters I, 2, 4 (Sections 4.1 and 4.2), 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23. For a one-semester course with an emphasis on regulatory economics a possible course sequence is Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4 (Section 4.1 only), 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 24, 25, and 26.